This past Thursday, President Barack Obama announced a new strategy for our nation’s armed forces for the upcoming era of “austerity.” The president outlined a plan whereby the $489 billion in budget cuts over the next 10 years would be part of a larger strategy of reducing U.S. ground forces and shifting the focus from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. Although the United States does face growing hostilities in the region, cutting land forces will only handicap its ability to respond to conflicts in Asia-Pacific and in the Middle East.

The president’s new plan is partially based on the assumption that operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan — which involve a large military commitment over an extended period of time — will not be part of U.S. foreign policy in the future. Although the U.S. public and policymakers currently have an aversion toward nation-building, many of the factors that drew U.S. forces into Iraq are still present throughout the Middle East.

The diaspora of revolution that spread throughout Middle Eastern nations illustrates the type of conflicts that will require U.S. attention in the near future. These types of conflicts will require similar counterinsurgency strategies to those used in Iraq and Afghanistan, which aided in eliminating much of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership. The plan to reduce the size of the units trained in counterinsurgency that will conduct these operations handicaps our ability to respond to crises. We do not know where the revolutions of the Arab Spring will lead — whether these countries will become true democracies or fall into a cycle of dictatorship. Events like those in Libya, where it was not necessary for the United States to contribute ground forces, are few and far between. Although U.S. involvement in Libya provided an ideal model of military intervention, it cannot be the model by which foreign policy and military analysts judge world events. The factors that allowed for the United States to act in a solely economic and air support role are not likely to be a common recurrence, and future military engagements will likely require U.S. ground forces.

The U.S. force operating in Africa to hunt down and eliminate the Lord’s Resistance Army provides only one of many examples of the need for U.S. ground forces. Future wars, judging by the wars of the past decade, will not be between two or three formal armies, but against insurgencies. Humanitarian interventions are responsible for not simply protecting civilians from bloodshed, but also from ensuring that such bloodshed does not occur once the forces leave. This requires the use of counterinsurgency strategies — and the ground forces trained in their use — and the ability to deploy them effectively.

Furthermore, the growing influence of Iran within the region, worsening relations between the United States and Pakistan and the continuity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only require more attention by U.S. military forces and planners. The U.S. Navy, for which the president does not intend to cut funding, has the ability to project U.S. power and influence around the world at little human cost. Yet U.S. naval power does not extend into the heartland of the Middle East. Planes and ships can only do so much when it comes to rooting out terrorist organizations or enforcing peace agreements, operations in which the United States will continue to be involved in the coming decades. Looking at the Asia-Pacific region, the growing hostility of North Korea and the growing power and influence of China illustrate the need for increased U.S. attention in the region. The United States has historically acted as the buffer between North and South Korea and will likely continue to be the main deterrent from attempts at forceful reunification initiated by North Korea. Reducing the size of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps will decrease our ability to respond to or deter an invasion of the South, and will decrease our ability to deter China from attacking or harassing Taiwan.

Iran is simultaneously increasing its influence in Iraq and Afghanistan and bearing its teeth on the world stage. The ever-present Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship declines while India and Pakistan continue to stare at each other down the barrel of a nuclear rifle. This is a time of economic difficulty, and the Pentagon should respond as such. However, neglecting our responsibility to protect and enforce peace while limiting our ability to respond to conflict is not the “grand strategy” the nation needs or can afford.